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Abstract
In the framework of cooperative game theory, the concept of generalized value, which is an extension of that of value, has been re-
cently proposed to measure the overall inﬂuence of coalitions in games. Axiomatizations of two classes of genera-
lized values, namely probabilistic generalized values and generalized semivalues, which extend probabilistic values and
semivalues, respectively, are ﬁrst proposed. The axioms we utilize are based on natural extensions of axioms involved in
the axiomatizations of values. In the second half of the paper, special instances of generalized semivalues are also axio-
matized.
© 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
It is well known that the notion of value (see e.g. [2,5,9,17,18]) has been introduced to measure the individual power
of each player in a cooperative game. In some sense, this individual power can be regarded as the inﬂuence the player
has in the game.
It is natural to extend this notion of power to coalitions of players. For example, suppose two or three players join
together to form a partnership in a game. It is then much more relevant to measure the power or the strength of such a
coalition in the game rather than the power of each of these players. This is exactly the role played by the generalized
values, which have been recently introduced by Marichal [12] to measure the overall inﬂuence of every coalition in a
game. More precisely, the concept of generalized value stems from the investigation of the inﬂuence of variables on
Boolean and pseudo-Boolean functions [4,10,12], which was motivated by the problem of searching for robust voting
schemes in game theory [3].
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Let v : 2N → R be a cooperative game on a ﬁnite set of players N. For a coalition S ⊆ N , the main generalized
values introduced in [12] are deﬁned as
Sh(v, S) :=
∑
T⊆N\S
(n − s − t)!t !
(n − s + 1)! [v(T ∪ S) − v(T )],
B(v, S) :=
∑
T⊆N\S
1
2n−s
[v(T ∪ S) − v(T )],
where n = |N |, s = |S|, and t = |T |. As we can see, these expressions can be interpreted as weighted means of the
marginal contributions v(T ∪ S) − v(T ) of coalition S to outer coalitions T ⊆ N\S. As they clearly coincide with
Shapley and Banzhaf values on singletons (i.e., when S = {i}), we will naturally call them the Shapley and Banzhaf
generalized values, respectively.
In this paper we introduce and axiomatize two families of generalized values, namely the broad class of probabilistic
generalized values and the narrower subclass of generalized semivalues obtained by additionally imposing the symmetry
axiom. Probabilistic generalized values can be seen as extensions of probabilistic values studied by Weber [18].
Generalized semivalues are extensions of semivalues, which were axiomatized by Dubey et al. [5]. We show that this
latter subclass encompasses the Shapley and Banzhaf generalized values, but also the game itself and its dual. We also
axiomatize these particular instances of generalized semivalues.
Besides the classical axiom of linearity, the axioms involved in the characterizations we present can be regarded
as natural generalizations of those used in the axiomatizations of values. Two of the most important axioms in the
proposed characterizations of probabilistic generalized values and generalized semivalues are the dummy coalition
axiom, which is a natural extension of the dummy player axiom [18, 3], and the positivity axiom, which generalizes
the one for values [11, 4] (called monotonicity in [18, 4]). The notion of partnership (see e.g. [11]) is also at the root
of some of the axioms we additionally impose to characterize the Shapley and Banzhaf generalized values.
In addition to these characterization resultsweprovide a representation theorem for generalized semivalues, extending
that of semivalues by Dubey et al. [5]. We also provide a compact formula linking any generalized semivalue with the
well-known Owen multilinear extension of a game [15].
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we recall some basic deﬁnitions and results we use in this paper.
In Section 3, we introduce the class of probabilistic generalized values and that of generalized semivalues. In the last
section we present our characterization results. Probabilistic generalized values and generalized semivalues are ﬁrst
axiomatized. Then, we yield representation theorems for generalized semivalues. Finally, the Shapley and Banzhaf
generalized values as well as three other instances of generalized semivalues are characterized by imposing additional
axioms.
In order to avoid a heavy notation, we adopt that used in [8]. Thus, we will often omit braces for singletons, e.g.,
by writing v(i), U\i instead of v({i}), U\{i}. Similarly, for pairs, we will write ij instead of {i, j}. Furthermore,
cardinalities of subsets S, T , . . . , will often be denoted by the corresponding lower case letters s, t, . . . , otherwise by
the standard notation |S|, |T |, . . . .
2. Preliminary deﬁnitions
We consider an inﬁnite set U, the universe of players. As usual, a game on U is a set function v : 2U → R such that
v(∅) = 0, which assigns to each coalition S ⊆ U its worth v(S).
In this section we recall some concepts and results we will use throughout.
2.1. Carriers
A set N ⊆ U is said to be a carrier (or support) of a game v when v(S) = v(N ∩ S) for all S ⊆ U . Thus, a game v
with carrier N ⊆ U is completely deﬁned by the knowledge of the coefﬁcients {v(S)}S⊆N and the players outside N
have no inﬂuence on the game since they do not contribute to any coalition.
In this paper, we restrict our attention to ﬁnite games, that is, games that possess ﬁnite carriers. We denote by G the
set of ﬁnite games on U and by GN the set of games with ﬁnite carrier N ⊂ U .
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2.2. Dividends and Möbius transform
Let us recall an equivalent representation of a game. Any game v ∈ GN can be uniquely expressed in terms of its
dividends {m(v, S)}S⊆N (see e.g. [9]) by
v(T ) =
∑
S⊆T
m(v, S) ∀T ⊆ N .
In combinatorics, the set function m(v, ·) : 2U → R is called the Möbius transform [16] of v and is given by
m(v, S) :=
∑
T⊆S
(−1)s−t v(T ) ∀S ⊆ U .
2.3. Unanimity games
Let us now recall two important simple games of GN .
The unanimity game for T ⊆ N , T 
= ∅, is deﬁned as the game uT such that, for all S ⊆ N , uT (S) := 1 if and only
if S ⊇ T and 0 otherwise. It is easy to check that T is a carrier of uT and that its Möbius transform is given, for all
S ⊆ N , by m(uT , S) = 1 if and only if S = T and 0 otherwise.
Following Dubey et al. [5, 1], for any T ⊆ N , we also consider the game uˆT ∈ GN , deﬁned for all S ⊆ N , by
uˆT (S) := 1 if and only if ST and 0 otherwise.
2.4. Permuted games
Following Shapley [17, 2], given a game v ∈ GN and a permutation  on U (i.e., a one-to-one mapping from U
onto itself), we denote by v the game deﬁned by
v[(S)] := v(S) ∀S ⊆ U ,
where (S) := {(i) | i ∈ S}. Note that (N) is a carrier of v.
2.5. Restricted and reduced games
Given a game v ∈ GN and a coalition A ⊆ N , the restriction of v to A [8] is a game of GA deﬁned by
vA(S) := v(S) ∀S ⊆ A.
This is equivalent to considering for v only coalitions containing players of A.
Given a coalition B ⊆ N\A, the restriction of v to A in the presence of B [8] is a game of GA deﬁned by
vA∪B(S) := v(S ∪ B) − v(B) ∀S ⊆ A.
This is equivalent to considering for v only coalitions containing coalition B and some players of A.
Given a game v ∈ GN and a coalition T ⊆ N , T 
= ∅, the reduced game with respect to T [8,14], denoted v[T ], is a
game of G(N\T )∪[T ] where [T ] indicates a single hypothetical player, which is the representative (or macro player) of
the players in T. It is deﬁned by
v[T ](S) := v(S),
v[T ](S ∪ [T ]) := v(S ∪ T ),
for all S ⊆ N\T .
2.6. Dummy coalitions and partnerships
A coalition S ⊆ U is said to be dummy in a game v ∈ GN if v(T ∪ S) = v(T ) + v(S) for all T ⊆ U\S. In other
words, the marginal contribution of a dummy coalition S to any coalition T not containing elements of S is simply its
worth v(S).
J.-L. Marichal et al. / Discrete Applied Mathematics 155 (2007) 26–43 29
A coalition S ⊆ U in a game v ∈ GN is said to be null if it is a dummy coalition in v such that v(S) = 0.
A dummy (resp., null ) player is a dummy (resp., null ) one-membered coalition.
A coalition P ⊆ U , P 
= ∅, is said to be a partnership [11, 4] in a game v ∈ GN if v(S ∪ T ) = v(T ) for all SP
and all T ⊆ U\P . In other words, as long as all the members of a partnership P are not all in coalition, the presence of
some of them only leaves unchanged the worth of any coalition not containing elements of P. In particular, v(S) = 0
for all SP .
Notice that, thus deﬁned, a partnership behaves like a single hypothetical player, that is, the game v and its reduced
version v[P ] can be considered as equivalent.
Now, a dummy partnership is simply a partnershipP ⊆ U that is dummy.Thus, a dummy partnership can be regarded
as a single hypothetical dummy player. It is easy to verify that any coalition P ⊆ U is a dummy partnership in the
corresponding unanimity game uP .
3. The concept of generalized value
Wenow introduce the concepts of probabilistic generalized value and generalized semivalue and present ﬁve instances
of them. Probabilistic values and semivalues are ﬁrst recalled.
3.1. Probabilistic values and semivalues
As mentioned in the introduction, generalized values can be seen as extensions of values. In turn, a value can be seen
as a function  : G×U → R that assigns to every player i ∈ U in a game v ∈ G his/her prospect (v, i) from playing
the game. The exact form of a value depends on the axioms that are imposed on it. For instance, the well-known Shapley
value can be deﬁned as the sole value that satisﬁes the linearity, dummy player, symmetry, and efﬁciency axioms [18,
Theorem 15].
Given a game v ∈ GN , the Shapley value of a player i ∈ N is given by
Sh(v, i) :=
∑
T⊆N\i
1
n
(
n − 1
t
)−1
[v(T ∪ i) − v(T )].
If i /∈N , we set Sh(v, i) := 0; see also [17, Lemma 1].
Another frequently encountered value is the Banzhaf value [2,6]. The Banzhaf value of a player i ∈ N in a game
v ∈ GN is deﬁned by
B(v, i) :=
∑
T⊆N\i
1
2n−1
[v(T ∪ i) − v(T )].
Here also, if i /∈N , we set B(v, i) := 0.
The Shapley and Banzhaf values are instances of probabilistic values [18] and, more precisely, of semivalues [5].
A probabilistic value p of a player i ∈ N in a game v ∈ GN is a value of the form
p(v, i) :=
∑
T⊆N\i
piT (N)[v(T ∪ i) − v(T )],
where the family of coefﬁcients {piT (N)}T⊆N\i forms a probability distribution on 2N\i . Again, if i /∈N , we naturally
set p(v, i) := 0.
Thus deﬁned, p(v, i) can be interpreted as the mathematical expectation on 2N\i of the marginal contribution
v(T ∪ i) − v(T ) of player i to a coalition T ⊆ N\i with respect to the probability distribution {piT (N)}T⊆N\i .
A semivalue is a probabilistic value such that, additionally, for all i ∈ N , the coefﬁcients piT (N) (T ⊆ N\i) depend
only on the cardinalities of the coalitions i, T, and N, i.e., there exist n nonnegative real numbers {pt (n)}t=0,...,n−1
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fulﬁlling
n−1∑
t=0
(
n − 1
t
)
pt (n) = 1
such that, for any i ∈ N and any T ⊆ N\i, we have piT (N) = pt (n).
3.2. Probabilistic generalized values and generalized semivalues
By analogy with the works of Dubey et al. [5] and Weber [18] on values, we can deﬁne the class of probabilistic
generalized values and the subclass of generalized semivalues.
A probabilistic generalized value of a coalition S ⊆ N in a game v ∈ GN is of the form
p(v, S) :=
∑
T⊆N\S
pST (N)[v(T ∪ S) − v(T )],
where, for any S ⊆ N , the family of coefﬁcients {pST (N)}T⊆N\S forms a probability distribution on 2N\S . If SN ,
we naturally set p(v, S) := p(v, S ∩ N).
A generalized semivalue is a probabilistic generalized value such that, additionally, for any S ⊆ N , the coefﬁcients
pST (N) (T ⊆ N\S) depend only on the cardinalities of the coalitions S, T, and N, i.e., for any s ∈ {0, . . . , n}, there
exists a family of nonnegative real numbers {pst (n)}t=0,...,n−s fulﬁlling
n−s∑
t=0
(
n − s
t
)
pst (n) = 1,
such that, for any S ⊆ N and any T ⊆ N\S, we have pST (N) = pst (n).
As instances of generalized semivalues, we obviously have the Shapley and Banzhaf generalized values, already
mentioned in the introduction. Recall that, for a game v ∈ GN and a coalition S ⊆ N , they are, respectively, deﬁned as
Sh(v, S) :=
∑
T⊆N\S
1
n − s + 1
(
n − s
t
)−1
[v(T ∪ S) − v(T )],
B(v, S) :=
∑
T⊆N\S
1
2n−s
[v(T ∪ S) − v(T )].
These indices are extensions of the Shapley and Banzhaf values in the sense that Sh(v, i)=Sh(v, i) and B(v, i)=
B(v, i) for all i ∈ U and all v ∈ G.
Another relevant generalized semivalue, which extends the Shapley value, is given by the formula
ch(v, S) =
∑
T⊆N\S
s
s + t
(
n
s + t
)−1
[v(T ∪ S) − v(T )]. (1)
This generalized valuewill be called the chaining generalized value, by analogywith the concept of chaining interaction
index [13], which is another probabilistic linear expression constructed with the same coefﬁcients as in formula (1).
We will yield an axiomatization of it in the next section.
Besides the Shapley, Banzhaf, and chaining generalized values, the mappings
int : (v, S) → v(S) and ext : (v, S) → v∗(S),
where v∗ ∈ GN is the dual of v ∈ GN , deﬁned by v∗(S) = v(N) − v(N\S), are also generalized semivalues. The
coefﬁcients of int(v, S) are deﬁned by pst (n) = 1 if t = 0 and 0 otherwise, while the coefﬁcients of ext(v, S) are
deﬁned by pst (n)=1 if t =n− s and 0 otherwise. These indices will be called internal and external generalized values,
respectively. This terminology will be justiﬁed in Section 4.5.
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3.3. Interpretation of probabilistic generalized values
Similar to probabilistic values, an interpretation of probabilistic generalized values can be easily given.
Consider a game v ∈ GN and suppose that any coalition S ⊆ N joins an outer coalition T ⊆ N\S picked at random
with probability pST (N). Then the generalized value p(v, S) can be immediately thought of as the mathematical
expectation of themarginal contribution [v(T ∪S)−v(T )] of S to the coalitionT. Depending on the given randomization
scheme, this generalized value takes a well-deﬁned form. For example,
• if the coalition S is equally likely to join any coalition T ⊆ N\S, its probability to join is pST (N) = 1/2n−s and we
get B(v, S);
• if the coalition S is equally likely to join any coalition T ⊆ N\S of size t (0 tn − s) and that all coalitions of
size t are equally likely, its probability to join is pST (N) =
(
n−s
t
)−1
/(n − s + 1) and we get Sh(v, S).
Such an interpretation of p(v, S), which naturally extends that of values (see e.g. [18]), is in full accordance with
the idea of a generalized power index. The power of any coalition S in v should not be solely determined by its worth
v(S), but also by all v(S ∪ T ) such that T ⊆ N\S. Indeed, the worth v(S) may be very low, suggesting that S has a
rather weak power, while v(S ∪ T ) may be much larger than v(S) for many coalitions T ⊆ N\S, suggesting that S
actually has a great power.
As expected, we have p(v,∅) = 0 trivially, which means that the empty coalition has no power.
4. Axiomatic characterizations
In this ﬁnal section, we provide our axiomatization and representation results. We ﬁrst axiomatize the classes of
probabilistic generalized values and generalized semivalues and we yield representation theorems for the latter class.
Then, bymeans of additional axioms, we characterize the Shapley, Banzhaf, chaining, internal, and external generalized
values.
In the rest of the paper, a generalized value is regarded as a function  : G× 2U → R such that, for any v ∈ G and
any S ⊆ U , (v, S) reﬂects the power of coalition S in the game v.
4.1. Characterizations of probabilistic generalized values and generalized semivalues
We shall now axiomatize the class of probabilistic generalized values and that of generalized semivalues. The proofs,
mainly inspired from Weber [18], are given in Appendix A. The following axioms are ﬁrst considered:
• Carrier axiom (C): For any ﬁnite N ⊂ U , n1, and any v ∈ GN , we have (v, S) = (v, S ∩ N) for all S ⊆ U .
• Linearity axiom (L):  is a linear function with respect to its ﬁrst argument.
• Additivity axiom (A):  is an additive function with respect to its ﬁrst argument.
• Positivity axiom (P ): For any monotone v ∈ G, we have (v, S)0 for all S ⊆ U .
• First dummy coalition axiom (DC′): If S ⊆ U is a dummy coalition in a game v ∈ G, then (v, S) = v(S).
• Symmetry axiom (S): For any permutation  on U, and any v ∈ G, we have (v, S) = (v, (S)) for all S ⊆ U .
These axioms are very natural and have straightforward interpretations. Axiom (C) means that the players outside
the carrier should not contribute to the power of any coalition. Axiom (L) (resp., (A)) indicates that generalized values
should be decomposable linearly (resp., additively) whenever games are decomposable linearly (resp., additively).
Axiom (P), used for one-membered coalitions byWeber [18, 4] to characterize probabilistic values, states that since in
a monotone game the marginal contributions of any coalition are necessarily nonnegative, its generalized value should
be nonnegative, too.Axiom (DC′), which is a generalization of the classical dummy axiom [18, 3], states that a dummy
coalition has a generalized value equal to its worth. Finally, axiom (S) indicates that the names of the players play no
role in determining the generalized values.
We ﬁrst present an immediate description of linear generalized values.
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Proposition 4.1. A function  : G× 2U → R satisﬁes axiom (L) if and only if, for any ﬁnite set N ⊂ U , n1, and
any S ⊆ N , there exists a family of real constants {ST (N)}T⊆N such that, for any v ∈ GN , we have
(v, S) =
∑
T⊆N
ST (N)v(T ).
The following result, less trivial, shows that adding axiom (DC′)makes the marginal contributions [v(T ∪S)−v(T )]
appear in the expression of (v, S).
Proposition 4.2. A function  : G× 2U → R satisﬁes axioms (L) and (DC′) if and only if, for any ﬁnite set N ⊂ U ,
n1, and any S ⊆ N , there exists a family of real constants {pST (N)}T⊆N\S , satisfying
∑
T⊆N\SpST (N) = 1, such
that, for any v ∈ GN , we have
(v, S) =
∑
T⊆N\S
pST (N)[v(T ∪ S) − v(T )].
Now, by using axiom (P), we can easily characterize the classes of probabilistic generalized values and generalized
semivalues. It is noteworthy that, under this axiom, axiom (L) can be weakened into (A), as the following lemma shows.
Lemma 4.1. If  : G× 2U → R satisﬁes axioms (A) and (P ) then it also satisﬁes axiom (L).
The axiomatizations of probabilistic generalized values and generalized semivalues can then be formulated as follows.
Axiom (C) has been added only to deﬁne generalized values for coalitions not included in the carrier.
Theorem 4.1. A function  : G × 2U → R satisﬁes axioms (C), (A), (DC′), and (P ) if and only if, for any
ﬁnite set N ⊂ U , n1, and any S ⊆ N , there exists a family of nonnegative constants {pST (N)}T⊆N\S , satisfying∑
T⊆N\SpST (N) = 1, such that, for any v ∈ GN , we have
(v, S) =
∑
T⊆N\S
pST (N)[v(T ∪ S) − v(T )],
and for any SN and any v ∈ GN , we have (v, S) = (v, S ∩ N).
Theorem 4.2. A function  : G × 2U → R satisﬁes axioms (C), (A), (DC′), (P ), and (S) if and only if, for any
ﬁnite set N ⊂ U , n1, and any S ⊆ N , there exists a family of nonnegative constants {pst (n)}t=0,...,n−s satisfying∑n−s
t=0
(
n−s
t
)
pst (n) = 1, such that, for any v ∈ GN , we have
(v, S) =
∑
T⊆N\S
pst (n)[v(T ∪ S) − v(T )],
and for any SN and any v ∈ GN , we have (v, S) = (v, S ∩ N).
4.2. Representation theorems for generalized semivalues
Wenowpresent a generalization of the representation theorem given byDubey et al. [5, Theorem 1(a)] for semivalues.
The proof, given in Appendix B, is mainly based on the so-called power moment problem on [0, 1], also known as the
Hausdorff’s moment problem (see e.g. [1, Chapter 2, 6.4]).
Theorem 4.3. Ifp is a generalized semivalue given in the form of Theorem 4.2, then, for any ﬁnite set N ⊂ U , n1,
and any s ∈ {1, . . . , n}, there exists a uniquely determined cumulative density function (CDF) Fs on [0, 1] such that
pst (n) =
∫ 1
0
xt (1 − x)n−s−t dFs(x) ∀t ∈ {0, . . . , n − s}, (2)
where the integral is to be understood in the sense of Riemann–Stieltjes.
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Thus, with each generalized semivalue p is associated a unique denumerable family of CDFsF := {Fs | s1}
and we will write F := p. Note that, for s = 0, the coefﬁcients pst (n) in Theorem 4.2 are undetermined and hence
they can be deﬁned also from Eq. (2).
Remark. It is easy to see that the CDFs corresponding to the Shapley, Banzhaf, and chaining generalized values as
well as for the internal and external generalized values are given in the following table, where, for any E ⊆ [0, 1], 1E
denotes the characteristic function of E:
Sh B ch int ext
Fs(x)= x 1[1/2,1] xs 1]0,1] 1]0,1] 1{1}
The following result will be useful as we go on.
Proposition 4.3. For any ﬁnite N ⊂ U , n1, and any S ⊆ N , any generalized semivalue can be rewritten in terms
of the Möbius transform as
p(v, S) =
∑
T⊆N
T∩S 
=∅
qs|T \S|(n)m(v, T ) ∀v ∈ GN , (3)
where, for all T ⊆ N , with T ∩ S 
= ∅,
qs|T \S|(n) =
n−s−|T \S|∑
k=0
(
n − s − |T \S|
k
)
psk+|T \S|(n).
By combining Theorem 4.3 and Proposition 4.3, it is easy to see that, for any ﬁnite N ⊂ U , n1, we have
F(v, S) =
∑
T⊆N
T∩S 
=∅
[∫ 1
0
x|T \S| dFs(x)
]
m(v, T ) ∀v ∈ GN, ∀S ⊆ N (4)
which shows that the coefﬁcients qs|T \S|(n) of Proposition 4.3 do not depend on n. More precisely, we have
qs|T \S|(n) = qs|T \S| = ps|T \S|(s + |T \S|)
for all S, T ⊆ N , with T ∩ S 
= ∅.
The coefﬁcients qs|T \S| for the particular generalized values introduced thus far are given in the following table:
Sh B ch int ext
qs|T \S|=
1
|T \S| + 1
1
2|T \S|
s
|S ∪ T |
{
1 if T ⊆ S
0 else 1
Remark. Eq. (3) shows that any generalized semivalue p is a weighted sum over T ⊆ N , with T ∩ S 
= ∅, of
the dividends m(v, T ). In this sum, each coefﬁcient qs|T \S| represents the extent to which m(v, T ) contributes in the
computation of p. For example, for the chaining and Banzhaf interaction indices, these coefﬁcients are, respectively,
given by
s
|S ∪ T | =
|S|
|S ∪ (T \S)| and
1
2|T \S|
= |2
S |
|2S∪(T \S)|
which shows that m(v, T ) is weighted by the contribution of S as a subset of S ∪ T , where we reason on the elements
in the ﬁrst case and on the subsets in the second case. Similarly, for the Shapley and Banzhaf interaction indices, the
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coefﬁcients are, respectively, given by
1
|T \S| + 1 =
|[S]|
|[S] ∪ (T \S)| and
1
2|T \S|
= |2
[S]|
|2[S]∪(T \S)|
again showing that m(v, T ) is weighted by the contribution of S in S ∪T except that, this time, S is regarded as a single
representative [S].
Now, let N ⊂ U ﬁnite, n1, and v ∈ GN . Consider the so-called Owen multilinear extension g : [0, 1]n → R of v
[15], namely
g(x) :=
∑
T⊆N
v(T )
∏
i∈T
xi
∏
i /∈T
(1 − xi) ∀x ∈ [0, 1]n
and, for any S ⊆ N , let Sg denote its S-slack, i.e., the difference
Sg(x) := g(1Sx−S) − g(0Sx−S) ∀x ∈ R,
where, for any x, y ∈ R, z = xSy−S denotes the n-dimensional vector deﬁned by zi = x, if i ∈ S, and zi = y, else.
It can be proved [12, 3] (see Owen [15] for the case s = 1) that
Sh(v, S) =
∫ 1
0
Sg(x) dx ∀S ⊆ N (5)
which means that the Shapley generalized value related to S can be obtained by integrating the S-slack of g along the
main diagonal of the unit hypercube.
By combining Eq. (4) and the formula
Sg(x) =
∑
T⊆N
T∩S 
=∅
x|T \S|m(v, T ) ∀x ∈ R
(see [12, 3]), we can immediately extend formula (5) to any generalized semivalue. The result can be stated as follows.
Theorem 4.4. Let N ⊂ U ﬁnite, n1, and v ∈ GN . For any generalized semivalue F, associated with the family of
CDFsF := {Fs | s1}, we have
F(v, S) =
∫ 1
0
Sg(x) dFs(x) ∀S ⊆ N ,
where g : [0, 1]n → R is the multilinear extension of v.
We shall now proceed with the characterizations of the Shapley, Banzhaf, and chaining generalized values as well
as the internal and external generalized values, which all are instances of generalized semivalues.
4.3. Characterizations of the Shapley and Banzhaf generalized values
The following axioms are ﬁrst additionally considered:
• Recursivity axiom (R): For any ﬁnite N ⊂ U , n1, and any disjoint coalitions S, T ⊆ N in a game v ∈ GN ,
(v, S ∪ T ) = (vN\T , S) + (vN\S∪S , T ).
• Second dummy coalition axiom (DC′′): For any ﬁnite N ⊂ U , n1, if T ⊆ N is a dummy coalition in a game
v ∈ GN then
(v, S ∪ T ) = (vN\T , S) + (v, T ) ∀S ⊆ N\T .
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• Reduced partnership consistency axiom (RPC): For any ﬁnite N ⊂ U , n1, if P ⊆ N is a partnership in a game
v ∈ GN then
(v, P ) = (v[P ], [P ]).
Axiom (R) means that when a coalition T ⊆ N joins a coalition S ⊆ N\T , the resulting power equals the power
of S in the absence of T plus the power of T in the presence of S. If, in addition, the joining coalition T is dummy then
axiom (DC′′) says that the power of T is not inﬂuenced by the presence of S.
Now, recall that a partnership P can be considered as behaving like a single hypothetical player. Axiom (RPC)
identiﬁes the power of this partnership with that of its representative [P ] in the corresponding reduced game v[P ].
We now prove that, for any generalized semivaluep, the three axioms above are equivalent. Moreover, in this case,
p is completely determined by its corresponding value on singletons. The proof of this result is given inAppendix C.
Lemma 4.2. Let p be a generalized semivalue given in the form of Theorem 4.2. Then the following assertions are
equivalent:
(i) p satisﬁes axiom (R).
(ii) p satisﬁes axiom (DC′′).
(iii) p satisﬁes axiom (RPC).
(iv) For any n1, any s ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and any t ∈ {0, . . . , n − s}, we have
pst (n) = p1t (n − s + 1).
Actually, it is easy to see that, under conditions of Lemma 4.2, the identity p(v, S) = p(v[S], [S]) also holds for
any generalized semivalue p, any ﬁnite N ⊂ U , n1, any coalition S ⊆ N , and any v ∈ GN .
Lemma 4.2 enables us to characterize Shapley and Banzhaf generalized values from axiomatizations of Shapley and
Banzhaf values. For this purpose, we consider the following two axioms:
• Efﬁciency (E): For any N ⊂ U ﬁnite, n1, and any v ∈ GN , we have
∑
i∈N
(v, i) = v(N).
• 2-efﬁciency (2-E): For any N ⊂ U ﬁnite, n2, and any v ∈ GN , we have
(v, i) + (v, j) = (v[ij ], [ij ]) ∀ij ⊆ N .
Axiom (E), initially considered by Shapley [17], is dedicated to values and ensures that the players of N in a game
v ∈ GN share the total amount v(N) among them in terms of their respective values. Axiom (2-E), initially considered
by Nowak [14], expresses the fact that the sum of the values of two players should be equal to the value of these players
considered as twins in the corresponding reduced game.
The following lemmas can be immediately deduced from [18, Theorem 15; 8, Theorem 2].
Lemma 4.3. If p is a generalized semivalue additionally satisfying axiom (E), then, for any v ∈ G and any i ∈ U ,
p(v, i) is the Shapley value of i in the game v.
Lemma 4.4. Ifp is a generalized semivalue additionally satisfying axiom (2-E), then, for any v ∈ G and any i ∈ U ,
p(v, i) is the Banzhaf value of i in the game v.
We are now ready to state characterizations of the Shapley and Banzhaf generalized values. They immediately follow
from Lemmas 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4.
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Theorem 4.5. The Shapley generalized value is the only generalized semivalue additionally satisfying axioms (R or
DC′′ or RPC) and (E).As a consequence, the Shapley generalized value is the only generalized value satisfying axioms
(C), (A), (DC′), (P ), (S), (R or DC′′ or RPC), and (E).
Theorem 4.6. The Banzhaf generalized value is the only generalized semivalue additionally satisfying axioms (R or
DC′′ or RPC) and (2-E). As a consequence, the Banzhaf interaction index is the only generalized value satisfying
axioms (C), (A), (DC′), (P ), (S), (R or DC′′ or RPC), and (2-E).
4.4. Characterizations of the Banzhaf and chaining generalized values by means of the partnership-allocation axiom
We consider the following additional axiom:
• Partnership-allocation axiom (PA): For any N ⊂ U ﬁnite, n1, and any partnership P ⊆ N in v ∈ GN , there
exists |P | ∈ R such that
(v, P ) = |P |(v, i) ∀i ∈ P . (6)
Let N ⊂ U ﬁnite, n1, p be a generalized semivalue, P ⊆ N be a partnership in a game v ∈ GN , and i be a
member of P. Axiom (PA) is based on the following intuitive reasoning:
1. We know that p(v, P ) is a weighted arithmetic mean of the marginal contributions v(T ∪P)− v(T ) (T ⊆ N\P)
and it is easy to verify that p(v, i) is a weighted sum of these same marginal contributions. In other words, both
p(v, P ) and p(v, i) can be considered as measuring the value in the game v of the hypothetical macro player
corresponding to P.
2. Let  be a real number such that p(v, P ) = p(v, i). Notice that this equality still holds if i is replaced with any
other player j ∈ P , since all players in a partnership play symmetric roles. Hence, the coefﬁcient  depends only
on v and P and can then be seen as determining the way p(v, P ) is calculated from the value of any of the players
of the partnership, quantity that contains all the “relevant information” as discussed in Point 1.
3. It could then be required that the way the value of P is determined from the value of any player of the partnership
does not depend on the underlying game. Therefore, it depends only on |P |, which justiﬁes axiom (PA).
For generalized semivalues p, the expression of |P | in Eq. (6) can be easily obtained. We simply have
1 = |P |p(uP , i) ∀i ∈ P ,
since coalition P is always a dummy partnership in the unanimity game uP .
We now show that, under axiom (PA), any generalized semivalue p is completely determined by its corresponding
value on singletons. The proof is given in Appendix D.
Lemma 4.5. Let p be a generalized semivalue given in the form of Proposition 4.3. Then, p satisﬁes axiom (PA)
if and only if
qst−sq1s−1 = q1t−1 ∀ts1.
We can now state another characterization of the Banzhaf generalized value and a characterization of the chaining
generalized value. These characterizations immediately follow from Lemmas 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5.
Theorem 4.7. The Banzhaf generalized value is the only generalized semivalue additionally satisfying axioms (PA)
and (2-E). As a consequence, the Banzhaf generalized value is the only generalized value satisfying axioms (C), (A),
(DC′), (P ), (S), (PA), and (2-E).
Theorem 4.8. The chaining generalized value is the only generalized semivalue additionally satisfying axioms (PA)
and (E). As a consequence, the chaining interaction index is the only generalized value satisfying axioms (C), (A),
(DC′), (P ), (S), (PA), and (E).
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4.5. Characterizations of the internal and external generalized values
Finally, we consider two last axioms in order to characterize the internal and external generalized values (i.e., the
game itself and its dual):
• Internal generalized value axiom (IGV ): For any S ⊆ U , s1, and any v ∈ G, we have (v, S) = (vS, S).
• External generalized value axiom (EGV ): For any N ⊂ U ﬁnite, n1, any S ⊆ N , s1, and any v ∈ GN ,
we have (v, S) = (vS∪N\S, S).
Axiom (IGV) simply states that the generalized value of a coalition S in a game v should be independent of players
that are outside S. At the opposite, axiom (EGV) states the generalized value of a coalition S in a game v should be
measured in the presence of all outside players.
We can then state the following two characterizations. They are immediate since, for any probabilistic generalized
value p, we have p(vS, S) = v(S) and p(vS∪N\S, S) = v∗(S).
Theorem 4.9. The internal generalized value is the only generalized semivalue additionally satisfying axiom (IGV).
As a consequence, the internal generalized value is the only generalized value satisfying axioms (C), (A), (DC′), (P ),
and (IGV ).
Theorem 4.10. The external generalized value is the only generalized semivalue additionally satisfying axiom (EGV ).
As a consequence, the external generalized value is the only generalized value satisfying axioms (C), (A), (DC′), (P ),
and (EGV).
5. Conclusion
Axiomatic characterizations of the broad class of probabilistic generalized values and of the narrower subclass of
generalized semivalues have been proposed. The presented characterizations are mainly based on a natural general-
ization of the dummy player axiom, namely the dummy coalition axiom. Then, by further imposing classical axioms
such as efﬁciency, 2-efﬁciency, as well as some other natural axioms, we have characterized the Shapley, Banzhaf, and
chaining generalized values.
In a companion paper [7] we provide axiomatizations of probabilistic and cardinal-probabilistic interaction indices,
that is, probabilistic linear indices measuring the interaction phenomena among players [8]. Although the approach is
formally similar, the axioms proposed in [7] are more focused on the concept of partnership and dummy partnership.
Appendix A. Proofs of results from Section 4.1
Proof of Proposition 4.2. (Sufﬁciency): Trivial.
(Necessity): The proof is inspired from that of Weber [18, Theorem 2] for values.
Consider a ﬁnite set N ⊂ U , n1. The result holds trivially when S = N since N is dummy in any v ∈ GN .
Let SN . From Proposition 4.1, for any v ∈ GN , we have
(v, S) =
∑
T⊆N\S
∑
L⊆S
ST∪L(N)v(T ∪ L). (7)
Let us prove that
∑
L⊆S
ST∪L(N) = 0 ∀T ⊆ N\S, T 
= ∅. (8)
This is true when T = N\S. Indeed, since S is dummy in uN\S , we have∑
L⊆S
S(N\S)∪L(N) = (uN\S, S) = uN\S(S) = 0.
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Now, assume the result holds for |T |k + 1, with 1kn − s − 1, and show it still holds for |T | = k. Considering
K ⊆ N\S, with |K| = k1, we have, since S is dummy in uK ,
0 = uK(S) = (uK, S) =
∑
T⊆N\S
T⊇K
∑
L⊆S
ST∪L(N)
=
∑
T⊆N\S
TK
∑
L⊆S
ST∪L(N) +
∑
L⊆S
SK∪L(N)
=
∑
L⊆S
SK∪L(N)
by induction hypothesis and axiom (DC′).
Now, it follows from Eqs. (7) and (8) that
(v, S) =
∑
T⊆N\S
∑
L⊆S
ST∪L(N)[v(T ∪ L) − v(T )]
for all v ∈ GN . Clearly, we can now assume that S 
= ∅.
Coalition S being dummy in uS , we immediately have that
∑
T⊆N\SST∪S(N)= 1 from axiom (DC′). It follows that,
for any w ∈ GN in which S is a dummy coalition, we have
∑
T⊆N\S
∑
LS
ST∪L(N)[w(T ∪ L) − w(T )] = 0.
By choosing an appropriate such game w, we can easily prove that the coefﬁcients ST∪L(N) of this latter equation all
are zero. Just ﬁx T ∗ ⊆ N\S and L∗S and consider any game w ∈ GN fulﬁlling the conditions
w(T ∪ S) = w(T ) + w(S) ∀T ⊆ N\S,
w(T ∪ L) = w(T ) ∀T ⊆ N\S ∀LS, L 
= L∗,
w(T ∪ L∗) = w(T ) ∀T ⊆ N\S, T 
= T ∗,
w(T ∗ ∪ L∗) 
= w(T ∗).
Consequently, for any v ∈ GN , we have
(v, S) =
∑
T⊆N\S
pST (N)[v(T ∪ S) − v(T )],
where pST (N) := ST∪S(N) and
∑
T⊆N\SpST (N) = 1. 
Proof of Lemma 4.1. We only need to show that, for any v ∈ G, any  ∈ R, and any S ⊆ U , we have (v, S) =
(v, S). Since the family of unanimity games {uT }T⊆U,T 
=∅ is a basis of G, it sufﬁces to prove the equality when v
is an arbitrary unanimity game.
Let S, T ⊆ U , with T 
= ∅, and let  ∈ R. Consider sequences rk and sk of rational numbers converging to  and
such that skrk for all k. By (A), we have (rkuT , S) = rk(uT , S) and (skuT , S) = sk(uT , S) for all k.
Now, by (P) the following real sequences
((rk − )uT , S) and ((− sk)uT , S)
are clearly nonnegative. On the other hand, by (A), the ﬁrst one converges to l := (uT , S) − (uT , S) and the
second one converges to −l. It follows that l = 0 which completes the proof. 
Proof of Theorem 4.1. (Sufﬁciency): Trivial.
(Necessity): The proof is similar to that of Weber [18, Theorem 4].
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By lemma 4.1,  fulﬁlls axiom (L) and Proposition 4.2 applies. Consider a ﬁnite set N ⊂ U , n1, let S ⊆ N ,
S 
= ∅, and ﬁx T ∗ ⊆ N\S. The simple game uˆT ∗ is monotone and we have (uˆT ∗ , S)=pST ∗(N). From axiom (P), this
coefﬁcient is nonnegative.
When S = ∅, the coefﬁcients can be chosen arbitrarily, and hence nonnegative.
Finally, axiom (C) enables us to deﬁne  for coalitions SN . 
Proof of Theorem 4.2. (Sufﬁciency): Trivial.
(Necessity): The proof is similar to that of Weber [18, Theorem 10].
We ﬁrst observe that Theorem 4.1 applies. Hence, consider a ﬁnite set N ⊂ U , n1, and a subset S ⊆ N . Again,
we can assume that S 
= ∅.
Consider T1, T2 ⊆ N\S and a permutation  on N such that (T1) = T2 while leaving S ﬁxed. Then, using axiom
(S) and the games uˆT1 , uˆT2 ∈ GN , we can write
pST1(N) = (uˆT1 , S) = (uˆT1 , (S)) = (uˆT2 , S) = pST2(N).
Next, consider nonempty sets S1, S2 ⊆ N of the same cardinality, a set T ⊆ N\(S1 ∪ S2), and a permutation  on N
such that (S1)= S2 while leaving T invariant. Then, using axiom (S) and the game uˆT ∈ GN , we have uˆT = uˆT and
p
S1
T (N) = (uˆT , S1) = (uˆT , (S1)) = (uˆT , S2) = pS2T (N).
Finally, consider a nonempty ﬁnite set S ⊂ U , a ﬁnite set T ⊂ U\S, two ﬁnite setsN1, N2 ⊂ U such that n1=n21
and N1 ∩ N2 ⊇ S ∪ T , and a permutation  on U such that (N1) = N2 leaving S and T invariant. Then,
pST (N1) = (uˆN1T , S) = (uˆN1T , (S)) = (uˆN2T , S) = pST (N2).
It follows that, for any ﬁnite N ⊂ U , n1, and any S ⊆ N , the coefﬁcients pST (N) (T ⊆ N\S) depend only on the
cardinalities of the coalitions S, T, and N. Equivalently, for any integers n1 and s ∈ {0, . . . , n}, there exists a family
of nonnegative real numbers {pst (n)}t=0,...,n−s fulﬁlling
n−s∑
t=0
(
n − s
t
)
pst (n) = 1,
such that, for any ﬁnite N ⊂ U , n1, any S ⊆ N , and any T ⊆ N\S, we have pST (N) = pst (n).
Finally, axiom (C) enables us to deﬁne  for coalitions SN . 
Appendix B. Proofs of results from Section 4.2
Proof of Theorem 4.3. We proceed nearly as in [5, Theorem 1(a)].
Let N ⊂ U ﬁnite, with n1, let T ⊆ N , and consider the simple game uˆT ∈ GN .
WeknowfromTheorem4.2 that, for eachK ⊆ N , k1, there exists a family of nonnegative numbers {pkl (n)}l=0,...,n−k
such that, for any v ∈ GN ,
p(v,K) =
∑
L⊆N\K
pkl (n)[v(L ∪ K) − v(L)].
Let S ⊆ N\T , s1. For the game uˆT , it is easy to verify that
p(uˆT , S) = pst (n). (9)
Let i ∈ U\N . N being a carrier of uˆT , N ∪ i is also a carrier of uˆT in which i is a null player. We know that, for each
K ⊆ N ∪ i, k1, there exists a family of nonnegative numbers {pkl (n + 1)}l=0,...,n+1−k such that, for any v ∈ GN∪i ,
p(v,K) =
∑
L⊆(N∪i)\K
pkl (n + 1)[v(L ∪ K) − v(L)].
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For the game uˆT seen as an element of GN∪i and the coalition S, it is easy to verify that
p(uˆT , S) = pst (n + 1) + pst+1(n + 1).
From Eq. (9), it follows that the coefﬁcients pst (n) obey the recurrence relation
pst (n) = pst (n + 1) + pst+1(n + 1).
Setting sl := psl (s + l) for all l ∈ N, we can prove by induction that
pst (n) = (−1)n−s−t
n−s−t∑
i=0
(−1)i
(
n − s − t
i
)
sn−s−i
= (−1)n−s−t∇n−s−tsn−s , (10)
for all n1, all s ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and all t ∈ {0, . . . , n − s}, where ∇k denotes the kth iterate of the standard backward
difference operator ∇.
Clearly, the sequence (sm)m0 is nonnegative and s0 =ps0(s)= 1. Moreover, we have (−1)k∇ksm0 for all km.
Then, according toHausdorff’smoment problem (see e.g. [1, Theorem 2.6.4]), we know that s0, s1, . . . are themoments
of a uniquely determined CDF Fs on [0, 1], that is, we have
sm =
∫ 1
0
xm dFs(x) ∀m0.
Therefore, for each t ∈ {0, . . . , n − s}, we have, by Eq. (10),
pst (n) =
∫ 1
0
xt
n−s−t∑
i=0
(
n − s − t
i
)
(−x)n−s−t−i dFs(x)
=
∫ 1
0
xt (1 − x)n−s−t dFs(x),
which completes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 4.3. Let N ⊂ U ﬁnite, n1, let S ⊆ N and let v ∈ GN . Then, by using the linear expression
of the game in terms of its dividends, we have successively
p(v, S) =
∑
T⊆N\S
pst (n)[v(T ∪ S) − v(T )]
=
∑
T⊆N\S
pst (n)
∑
K⊆T∪S
K∩S 
=∅
m(v,K)
=
∑
K⊆N
K∩S 
=∅
m(v,K)
∑
T⊆N\S
T⊇K\S
pst (n),
and the second sum reads
n−s∑
t=|K\S|
(
n − s − |K\S|
t − |K\S|
)
pst (n) =
n−s−|K\S|∑
t=0
(
n − s − |K\S|
t
)
pst+|K\S|(n),
which is sufﬁcient. 
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Appendix C. Proofs of results from Section 4.3
Proof of Lemma 4.2. (i) ⇒ (ii) LetN ⊂ U ﬁnite, n1 and let v ∈ GN . Consider a dummy coalitionK ⊆ N and any
coalition S ⊆ N\K . For any T ⊆ N\K , we have v(T ∪K)−v(T )=v(K) and hencep(vN\S∪S ,K)=v(K)=p(v,K).
(ii) ⇒ (iv) LetN ⊂ U ﬁnite, n1 and let v ∈ GN . Consider a dummy coalitionK ⊆ N and any nonempty coalition
S ⊆ N\K . Then we have p(v,K) = v(K) and
p(v, S ∪ K) =
∑
T⊆N\(S∪K)
ps+kt (n)[v(T ∪ S) − v(T )] + v(K),
p(v
N\K, S) =
∑
T⊆N\(S∪K)
pst (n − k)[v(T ∪ S) − v(T )].
It follows from axiom (DC′′) that∑
T⊆N\(S∪K)
[ps+kt (n) − pst (n − k)][v(T ∪ S) − v(T )] = 0.
Now, ﬁx T ∗ ⊆ N\(S ∪ K) and consider a game in which K is a dummy coalition and whose restriction on N\K is
uˆT ∗ . Then, considering this game in the previous equality yields
ps+kt (n) = pst (n − k) (11)
for all n1, all s ∈ {1, . . . , n}, all k ∈ {0, . . . , n} such that s + kn, and all t ∈ {0, . . . , n − s − k}. Finally, for any
s′ ∈ {1, . . . , n}, setting s := 1 and k := s′ − 1 in Eq. (11), we get
p1t (n − s′ + 1) = p1t (n − k) = ps
′
t (n).
(iv) ⇒ (i) Let N ⊂ U ﬁnite, n1. For any disjoint coalitions S, T ⊆ N in a game v ∈ GN , we have
p(v, S ∪ T ) =
∑
K⊆N\(S∪T )
ps+tk (n)[v(K ∪ S ∪ T ) − v(K)],
p(v
N\T , S) =
∑
K⊆N\(S∪T )
psk(n − t)[v(K ∪ S) − v(K)],
p(v
N\S
∪S , T ) =
∑
K⊆N\(S∪T )
ptk(n − s)[v(K ∪ S ∪ T ) − v(K ∪ S)].
But we have
ps+tk (n) = psk(n − t) = ptk(n − s) = p1k(n − s − t + 1)
and hence p satisﬁes axiom (R).
(iii) ⇒ (iv) Let N ⊂ U ﬁnite, n1, and let S ⊆ N be a nonempty partnership in v ∈ GN . The function p being a
generalized semivalue, we can write
p(v, S) =
∑
T⊆N\S
pst (n)[v(T ∪ S) − v(T )]. (12)
Furthermore, we have
p(v[S], [S]) =
∑
T⊆((N\S)∪[S])\[S]
p1t (n − s + 1)[v(T ∪ S) − v(T )].
Since p also satisﬁes axiom (RPC), we obtain∑
T⊆N\S
[pst (n) − p1t (n − s + 1)][v(T ∪ S) − v(T )] = 0. (13)
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Now, it is easy to verify that, for each T ⊆ N\S, S is a partnership in the unanimity game uT∪S and that
uT∪S(K ∪ S) − uT∪S(K) = 0 for KT and 1 for K ⊆ N\S, K ⊇ T . Thus, using the family of games {uT∪S}T⊆N\S
(starting with uN ) in Eq. (13), we obtain that
pst (n) = p1t (n − s + 1) ∀t ∈ {0, . . . , n − s}.
(iv) ⇒ (iii) Starting from Eq. (12) and the fact that pst (n)=p1t (n− s+1) for all t ∈ {0, . . . , n− s}, we immediately
obtain that p satisﬁes (RPC). 
Appendix D. Proofs of results from Section 4.4
Proof of Lemma 4.5. (Necessity): Let N ⊂ U ﬁnite, n1, let S ⊆ N , s1, and let T ⊇ S. Clearly, S is a partnership
in the game uT . Then, since p satisﬁes axiom (PA), we have
p(uT , S)p(uS, i) = p(uT , i) ∀i ∈ S.
Let i ∈ S. On the one hand, we have
p(uT , S)p(uS, i) = qst−sq1s−1
from the result given in Section 2.3 on the Möbius transform of a unanimity game. On the other hand,
p(uT , i) = q1t−1,
which implies the necessity.
(Sufﬁciency): Let N ⊂ U ﬁnite, n1, let S ⊆ N , s1, and let v ∈ GN be a game in which S is a partnership.
Let i ∈ S, T  i, and K = T \S. Then,
m(v, T ) =
∑
R⊆K
∑
L⊆T∩S
(−1)t−l−rv(R ∪ L).
If TS, then, for all L ⊆ T ∩ S, v(R ∪ L) = v(R), since S is a partnership in v. It follows that
m(v, T ) =
∑
R⊆K
(−1)t−rv(R)
∑
L⊆T∩S
(−1)l = 0.
Hence, m(v,L) = 0 for all L  i such that LS. Then, using Proposition 4.3 and the results given in Section 2.3,
we have
p(v, S)p(uS, i) =
∑
T⊇S
qst−sm(v, T )
∑
L⊇S
q1l−1m(uS, L)
=
∑
T⊇S
qst−sq1s−1m(v, T )
=
∑
T⊇S
q1t−1m(v, T )
=p(v, i),
and thus the sufﬁciency. 
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